Senate Proceeding on Sep 11th, 2009 :: 0:31:45 to 0:45:15
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0:31:44 to 0:32:12( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: mr. levin: mr. president, today we mark a solemn anniversary. 8 years ago this morning our nation was attacked by terrorist extreemists motivated by hatred and bent on destruction and it is always appropriate to remember the shock of that day, the innocent lives lost and the efforts of our nation has made since to ensure that Afganistan, the nation that hosted those terrorists, cannot again become a safehaven for terrorists seeking to attack us.

0:31:45 to 0:45:15( Edit History Discussion )
Speech By: Carl Levin

0:32:05 to 0:32:25( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: Today is an especially appropriate occasion to take stock of those efforts and consider how best to continue them. recently returned -- from a trip to afghanistan where i was joined by colleagues, senators

0:32:26 to 0:32:48( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: jack reed the situation in afghanistan is serious. security has deteriorated. but if we take the we can ensure does not rert taliban-friendly government that could once again provide a safe haven for al qaeda to terrorize us and the world. the obama administration's new

0:32:49 to 0:33:09( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: strategy focusing on securing the afghan population's safety and partnering with t security forces in that effort is an important start at reversing the situation in afghanistan. the change in strategy has led our forces in the words of general mcchrystal's counterinsurgency guidance to --

0:33:10 to 0:33:30( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: quote -- "live, eat, and train together with the afghan security forces, depend on one another and hold each other accountable and treat them as equal partners in the general's guidance goes on to say that the success of the afghan security forces -- quote -- "is our to achieve that goal, we should

0:33:31 to 0:33:51( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: increase and accelerate our efforts to support the afghan security forces in their efforts to become self-sufficient, delivering security to their nation. before we consider whether to increase u.s. combat forces above the levels already planned for the next few months.

0:33:52 to 0:34:12( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: these steps inclu increasing the size of the afghan army and police much faster than presently planned. afghan army and police than presently planned. providing them equipment than presently planned and looking to separate local taliban fighters from their leaders and attrack them to our

0:34:13 to 0:34:34( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: side of the gov as we did in iraq. while the security situation in afghanistan has worsened, we ve important advantages there the afghan people hate the taliban the public opinion polls there show support for the taliban at 5%. in addition, highly motivated and its troops

0:34:35 to 0:34:55( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: are proven fighters. despite those advantages, we face challenges. general mcchrystal believes and i believe that we need to regain the initiative. general mrk crystal w rightly so about the perception that we have lost that initiative and t that perception on the afghan people, their government, al

0:34:56 to 0:35:16( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: qaeda and the taliban the by contrast if we can dispel that perception, we commonsense will he local and lower-level taliban fighters to lay down their arms and afghan society. i believe the most effective way to retake the initiative in afghanistan is with a series

0:35:17 to 0:35:38( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: steps to eure that afghan's army and police have the manpower, equipment and support to secure their own nation. first, we should increase troop levels for police f planned. there are approximately 90,000 troops in the afghan army now. and that number is scheduled to

0:35:39 to 0:36:00( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: go up to 134,000 by october of 2010. the afghan police are scheduled to reach a level of ,000 by the same time. for a long time many of us have urged the establishment of a goal and 160,000 afghan police by

0:36:01 to 0:36:23( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: 2013. the afghan support those numbers. it appears that the afghan government and our government will accept those goals. the need more i believe it is both possible and essential to advance those

0:36:24 to 0:36:45( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: goals by a our own military in afghanistan has repeatedly pointed to a need for more afghan forces. in one sector of province, our marines

0:36:46 to 0:37:07( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: outnumbered afghan soldiers by a -- it was said that a lack of afghan troopts -- quote -- "is absolutely our akeely's -- achilles' heel." what do we according to one expert, there is no lack of afgn manpo

0:37:08 to 0:37:28( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: we are assured it is available the we will need more trainers. we train security f such an increase is possible. he indicated he would make an assessment of what would be necessary in order to meet the timetable.

0:37:29 to 0:37:49( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: we should press our nato allies with greater forcefulness to provide more trainers. if our nato ally also not through with the combat forces that they pledge, at least they can provide additional trainers. the mid-level afghan officers in

0:37:50 to 0:38:11( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: addition to support efforts to graduate more afghan officers from army akad miss, we should consider the recommendation of defense minister wardack, these who fought against the soviets return to service on an interim basis. those men are well qualified and motivated. while they might not be trained

0:38:12 to 0:38:33( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: in the most currenting they nonetheless could meet the need of the enlarged army while the new group of officers is trained. a larger afghan force will need supporting infrastructure such as barracks while the available infrastructure might not be the most modern, it is adequate and is in sufficient amounts.

0:38:34 to 0:38:54( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: the larger afghan security forces will require additional equipment. there must be a major effort to transfer a significant amount of the equipment coming out of iraq to the afghan army and police. such a sigficant commitment to equip the afghan security forces would also help demonstrate u.s. determination to take the

0:38:55 to 0:39:15( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: initiative and create momentum in the right there is an enormous amount o equipment coming out of iraq. our military is calling it one of greatest transfers of military goods in world history. a significant part of be transferred to the afghan forces, increasing their capability without weakening our

0:39:16 to 0:39:37( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: own readiness. and, yet, there does not seem to be that kind of a crash in place to do just that. we need to obtain on an urgent basis a list of the basic equipment needs of the afghan forces and a list of how those needs could be met in a more

0:39:38 to 0:39:59( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: program to tra leaving iraq. rapidly expanding afghan's military and police forces would address one of face. general mcchrystal waiting until 2014 creates a gap in capabilities that brings

0:40:00 to 0:40:21( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: significant risk of failure. but if we accelerate the training and equipping of forces by a year, we address his concern. depending on additional capability from afghanistan rather than u.s. forces addresses a major problem of public perception in afghanistan. the larger our own military

0:40:22 to 0:40:43( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: footprint there, the more our enemies can seek to drive a wedge between us and the afghan population spreading the falsehood that we seek to dominate a muslim nation. finally, we should make a concerted effort to separate the local taliban from their leaders. in iraq large numbers of young iraqis, who had been attacking

0:40:44 to 0:41:04( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: us switched over to our side and became the sons of iraq. they were drawn, in part, by the promise of jobs and amnesty for past attacks and in part, by the recognition that the status quo was creating horrific violence in their own communities. in their interest of their nation, they

0:41:05 to 0:41:25( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: switched sides and positive force. that same prospect exists in afghanistan. afghan leaders and our own military leaders say that local taliban forces are motivated largely by the need for a job, by loyalty to the local leader to pace them, and not by

0:41:26 to 0:41:46( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: ideology or religious zeal. they believe an effort to attract these fighters to the government side could succeed if they are offered security for themselves and their fam and if there's no penal for previous activity against us. general mcchrystal himself has emphasized the pro kengsal for

0:41:47 to 0:42:07( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: such reintegration -- the potential for reintegration as what here is what he said on july 28 -- quote --"most of the fighters we see in afghanistan are afghans, most we don't see are deep politically motivated.

0:42:08 to 0:42:29( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: most are operating for pay. some are under a commander's leadership, some are frustrated with loc leaders. so i believe, general mcchrystal said, there is significant potential to go after what i would call mid and low-level taliban fighters and leaders and o reintegration into afghanistan

0:42:30 to 0:42:53( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: under the constitution. close quote. but this game-changing possility was apparently not factored in -- into general mcchrystal's assessment. there is no plan yet to put in place a sons of iraq approach in afghanistan. it is urgent that we lay outhe steps that need to be taken to involve local and national

0:42:54 to 0:43:15( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: they alone can accomplish this crucial job, but first we and our afghan allies must draft such a plan and the potential positive impact of such a plan should be taken consider the need for any additional u.s. military resources. afghanistan's people are

0:43:16 to 0:43:37( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: grateful for our aid, but also eager to assume responsibility for their own in a tiny village we were invited to meet with the village elders at their council meeting called 100 or so men sitting on the floor chatted with us about their future and their country's future.

0:43:38 to 0:43:58( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: when asked how long the united states should stay one elder said -- quote -- "until the moment that you make our security then you will be welcomed to visit us, not as soldiers, but as guests helping afghanistan achieve

0:43:59 to 0:44:20( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: self-sufficiency in their own -- and their own security is everybody's goal. on that there's little difference of opinion and afghanistan's village councils are in the corridors of this capitol. can we help afghanistan reach self-sufficiency and security fast enough? regains the initiatives an crea need?

0:44:21 to 0:44:41( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: can we encourage the lower-level taliban to abandon headed by terrorists who fanaticism they don't share? i believe we can by supporting a a far more rapid growth in the afghanrmy and police. by providing more trainers more quickly. by a rapid infusion of t afghan units of equipment no

0:44:42 to 0:45:02( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: longer needed in iraq. and reintegration of lower-level taliban fighters society. in other words, we need a surge of afghan our support of their surge show ourommitment to the

0:45:03 to 0:45:15( Edit History Discussion )

Carl Levin: successive mission that is clearly in our national security interest without creating a bigger military footprint t provides propaganda fodder for the taliban. i believe that taking those